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The impact of government incentives and penalties on willingness to recycle plastic waste: An evolutionarygame theory perspective

Zhen Wang, Jiazhen Huo, Yongrui Duan

《环境科学与工程前沿（英文）》 2020年第14卷第2期 doi: 10.1007/s11783-019-1208-2

摘要： • Punishments increase the participation probability of collectors and recyclers. • Policy-sponsored incentives make collectors and recyclers to participate earlier. • Recyclers are more sensitive to government punishments than collectors. Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste, it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate. In this study, government is included as a player, alongside waste collectors and recyclers, in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling. The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling. Three conclusions are drawn from this research. First, an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process. Second, policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do. Finally, recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.

关键词： Plastic waste Recycle Reuse Government incentives Government penalties Evolutionary game

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Research on the ecological compensation standard of the basin pollution control project based on evolutionarygame theory and by taking Xiangjiang River as a case

Dongbin HU, Huiwu LIU, Xiaohong CHEN, Yang CHEN

《工程管理前沿（英文）》 2019年第6卷第4期页码 575-583 doi: 10.1007/s42524-019-0044-1

摘要： Ecological compensation is a new resource and environment management model. As one of the main areas for implementing ecological compensation policies, basin ecological compensation has become an important measure for encouraging basin pollution control projects and improving the quality of regional economic development. By applying the basic game analysis of evolutionary game theory and building an evolutionary game model with a “reward–punishment” mechanism, this paper compares the interest-related decision-making behaviors of the upstream and downstream stakeholders of basin ecological compensation. By using data on the water quality of Xiangjiang River Basin, this paper calculates the rewards and penalties in different intervals by building a parametric regression mathematical model and employing the local linear regression method. Results show that a decline in water quality should be fined RMB 925500 yuan, an improvement in water quality should be awarded RMB 1227800 yuan, and a deteriorating water quality should be severely fined RMB 5087600 yuan.

关键词： evolutionary game ecological compensation standard Xiangjiang River Basin

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Optimal production strategy for auto manufacturers with government subsidies in competitive environments

《工程管理前沿（英文）》 doi: 10.1007/s42524-023-0261-5

摘要： Using the Hotelling model and evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the optimal production strategy of duopoly auto manufacturers and explores the impacts of two government policies (manufacturer and consumer subsidies) on strategies related to the production of electric vehicles (EVs) or fuel vehicles (FVs). The study finds that consumers’ environmental preferences have direct effects on manufacturers’ market shares and profits, which in turn, affect the manufacturers’ production strategy selection. Specifically, when consumer environmental preference is sufficiently high, both auto manufacturers will eventually choose to produce EVs; when it is moderate, only one with a cost advantage will choose to produce EVs. Finally, when it is low, neither auto manufacturer will produce EVs. The findings further reveal that the more significant the difference in EV production costs is, the more inclined auto manufacturers are to choose a different final stable strategy. Regardless of whether the government subsidizes manufacturers or consumers, the policy only works if subsidies reach a certain threshold. The study also identifies the conditions under which government subsidies are considered more cost-effective.

关键词： supply chain management low-carbon emission electric vehicle subsidy evolutionary game theory

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An application of game theory in distributed collaborative decision making

Angran XIAO

《机械工程前沿（英文）》 2019年第14卷第1期页码 85-101 doi: 10.1007/s11465-019-0523-4

摘要： In a distributed product realization environment, new paradigms and accompanying software systems are necessary to support the collaborative work of geographically dispersed engineering teams from different disciplines who have different knowledge, experience, tools and resources. To verify the concept of collaboration by separation, we propose a generic information communication medium to enable knowledge representation and exchange between engineering teams, a digital interface. Across digital interfaces, each engineering team maintains its own perspective towards the product realization problem, and each controls a subset of design variables and seeks to maximize its own payoff function subject to individual constraints. Hence, we postulate the use of principles from game theory to model the relationships between engineering teams and facilitate collaborative decision making without causing unnecessary information exchange or iteration across digital interfaces. A product design and manufacturing scenario is introduced to demonstrate the efficacy of using game theory to maintain a clean interface between design and manufacturing teams.

关键词： collaboration distributed product realization game theory digital interface

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Developing a new model for simultaneous scheduling of two grand projects based on game theory and solving

Loghman PIRI, Vahidreza GHEZAVATI, Ashkan HAFEZALKOTOB

《工程管理前沿（英文）》 2022年第9卷第1期页码 117-134 doi: 10.1007/s42524-020-0115-3

摘要： Grand infrastructure projects, such as dam, power plant, petroleum, and gas industry projects, have several contractors working on them in several independent sub-projects. The concern of reducing the duration of these projects is one of the important issues among various aspects; thus, our aim is to fulfill the requirements by using the game theory approach. In this study, a mixed-integer programming model consisting of game theory and project scheduling is developed to reduce the duration of projects with a minimum increase in costs. In this model, two contractors in successive periods are entered into a step-by-step competition by the employer during dynamic games, considering an exchange in their limited resources. The optimum solution of the game in each stage are selected as the strategy, and the resources during the game are considered to be renewable and limited. The strategy of each contractor can be described as follows: 1) share their resources with the other contractor and 2) not share the resources with the other contractor. This model can act dynamically in all circumstances during project implementation. If a player chooses a non-optimum strategy, then this strategy can immediately update itself at the succeeding time period. The proposed model is solved using the exact Benders decomposition method, which is coded in GAMS software. The results suggest the implementation of four step-by-step games between the contractors. Then, the results of our model are compared with those of the conventional models. The projects’ duration in our model is reduced by 22.2%. The nominal revenue of both contractors has also reached a significant value of 46078 units compared with the relative value of zero units in the original model. Moreover, we observed in both projects the decreases of 19.5%, 20.9%, and 19.7% in the total stagnation of resources of types 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

关键词： project scheduling resource leveling between projects constrained resources game theory Benders decomposition

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Benefit-based cost allocation for residentially distributed photovoltaic systems in China: A cooperative gametheory approach

Xi LUO, Xiaojun LIU, Yanfeng LIU, Jiaping LIU, Yaxing WANG

《工程管理前沿（英文）》 2021年第8卷第2期页码 271-283 doi: 10.1007/s42524-019-0083-7

摘要： Distributed photovoltaic (PV) systems have constantly been the key to achieve a low-carbon economy in China. However, the development of Chinese distributed PV systems has failed to meet expectations because of their irrational profit and cost allocations. In this study, the methodology for calculating the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for PV is thoroughly discussed to address this issue. A mixed-integer linear programming model is built to determine the optimal system operation strategy with a benefit analysis. An externality-corrected mathematical model based on Shapley value is established to allocate the cost of distributed PV systems in 15 Chinese cities between the government, utility grid and residents. Results show that (i) an inverse relationship exists between the LCOEs and solar radiation levels; (ii) the government and residents gain extra benefits from the utility grid through net metering policies, and the utility grid should be the highly subsidized participant; (iii) the percentage of cost assigned to the utility grid and government should increase with the expansion of battery bank to weaken the impact of demand response on increasing theoretical subsidies; and (iv) apart from the LCOE, the local residential electricity prices remarkably impact the subsidy calculation results.

关键词： solar photovoltaic cost allocation cooperative game theory Shapley value mixed-integer linear programming levelized cost of energy

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基于敲出障碍期权和博弈理论的项目投资决策分析

吴云,何建敏

《中国工程科学》 2005年第7卷第9期页码 44-48

摘要：

阐述了实物期权的基本原理和敲出障碍期权的内涵及其定价求解，提出了基于敲出障碍期权的实物期权定价方法和博弈理论的项目投资决策分析，分析了双寡头市场结构下的项目投资决策，给出了算例分析。

关键词：敲出障碍期权实物期权博弈理论投资决策

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海洋维权的博弈问题

王磊,陈华,康美泽,马晓川

《中国工程科学》 2019年第21卷第6期页码 80-86 doi: 10.15302/J-SSCAE-2019.06.015

摘要：

本文以博弈论观点探讨海洋维权问题，包括海洋维权在处理海洋争端中的作用和地位，我国海洋维权博弈的性质、方向及博弈要素。当前阶段，推动海洋维权博弈微观化、事务性处理，从维权斗争向联合管治方向发展符合我国的国家利益。将作为海洋维权“斗争前线”的海上维权区分为“争议海区进入”“渔船越界维权”“非合作渔业博弈模型”3类基本博弈过程，分别开展博弈分析，据此研判我国海上维权力量建设的重点方向。研究表明：提高海洋产业科技水平、发展维权技术手段可以有效改变博弈收益，从而实现有利的博弈均衡；发展高技术干扰手段、水下防护技术、海洋广域监视技术和远海渔业开发技术，是在重复博弈过程中获得优势地位的重要保障。

关键词：海洋维权博弈海上维权技术联合国海洋法公约

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基于信息不对称的工程项目主体行为三方博弈分析

向鹏成,任宏

《中国工程科学》 2010年第12卷第9期页码 101-106

摘要：

在分析项目主体之间博弈关系的基础上，建立了一般项目和政府投资项目行为主体三方之间的行为博弈模型，分析了博弈混合策略纳什均衡解。最后从建立完善的建设管理制度、事先监督机制与事后惩罚机制、激励机制与约束机制等方面提出了规范项目主体行为的具体对策。

关键词：信息不对称工程项目主体行为风险风险管理博弈论

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Improving the resilience of maritime supply chains: The integration of ports and inland transporters in duopoly markets

《工程管理前沿（英文）》页码 51-66 doi: 10.1007/s42524-022-0231-3

摘要： The adverse impact of the outbreak of COVID-19 has reduced ports’ operational efficiency. In addition, ports and inland logistics providers are generally independent of each other and difficult to work together, which leads to time loss. Thus, as the core player, ports can integrate with inland logistics providers to improve the efficiency and resilience of maritime supply chains. This study examines the strategic options of two competing maritime supply chains consisting of ports and inland logistics providers. We investigate the impact of cooperation between ports and inland logistics providers and government regulation on the maritime supply chain by comparing members’ optimal pricing and overall social welfare under centralized, decentralized, and hybrid scenarios. Results indicate that the hybrid scenario is an equilibrium strategy for maritime supply chain, although this strategy is not optimal for governments seeking to improve supply chain resilience and maximize social welfare. Furthermore, observations show that through government economic intervention, both seaborne supplies can be incentivized to adopt an integrated strategy, and business and society can achieve a win–win situation.

关键词： resilience Hotelling model social welfare maritime supply chain game theory

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Evolutionary engineering of

Jixian GONG, Nan DUAN, Xueming ZHAO

《化学科学与工程前沿（英文）》 2012年第6卷第2期页码 174-178 doi: 10.1007/s11705-012-1276-3

摘要： Evolutionary engineering is a novel whole-genome wide engineering strategy inspired by natural evolution for strain improvement. Astaxanthin has been widely used in cosmetics, pharmaceutical and health care food due to its capability of quenching active oxygen. Strain improvement of , one of the main sources for natural astaxanthin, is of commercial interest for astaxanthin production. In this study a selection procedure was developed for adaptive evolution of strains under endogenetic selective pressure induced by additive in environmental niches. Six agents, which can induce active oxygen in cells, were added to the culture medium respectively to produce selective pressure in process of evolution. The initial strain, 2-1557, was mutagenized to acquire the initial strain population, which was then cultivated for 550 h at selective pressure and the culture was transferred every 48h. Finally, six evolved strains were selected after 150 generations of evolution. The evolved strains produced up to 48.2% more astaxanthin than the initial strain. Our procedure may provide a promising alternative for improvement of high-production strain.

关键词： evolutionary engineering astaxanthin strain improvement

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Sliding window games for cooperative building temperature control using a distributed learning method

Zhaohui ZHANG, Ruilong DENG, Tao YUAN, S. Joe QIN

《工程管理前沿（英文）》 2017年第4卷第3期页码 304-314 doi: 10.15302/J-FEM-2017045

摘要： In practice, an energy consumer often consists of a set of residential or commercial buildings, with individual units that are expected to cooperate to achieve overall optimization under modern electricity operations, such as time-of-use price. Global utility is decomposed to the payoff of each player, and each game is played over a prediction horizon through the design of a series of sliding window games by treating each building as a player. During the games, a distributed learning algorithm based on game theory is proposed such that each building learns to play a part of the global optimum through state transition. The proposed scheme is applied to a case study of three buildings to demonstrate its effectiveness.

关键词： game theory demand response HVAC control multi-building system

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一种基于博弈论的无线接入网中缓存资源共享方法 Article

Jun-feng XIE,Ren-chao XIE,Tao HUANG,Jiang LIU,F. Richard YU,Yun-jie LIU

《信息与电子工程前沿（英文）》 2016年第17卷第12期页码 1253-1265 doi: 10.1631/FITEE.1500497

摘要：随着智能手机、平板电脑等智能终端设备的快速普及，无线网络流量呈爆炸式增长，其中占主导地位的视频流量的增长尤为显著，根据思科的预测，从2014年到2019年，移动视频的复合年增长率（Compound annual growth rate, CAGR）为66%。在无线网络中部署缓存被认为是应对流量爆炸式增长的一种有效的解决方案。虽然已经有很多论文关注蜂窝网络中的内容缓存问题，但这些论文基本上都集中在内容缓存的性能优化和能量有效，而多个服务提供商（Service provider servers, SPSs）之间的缓存资源共享问题是被忽略的一个研究点。然而对于这个问题的研究是很有必要的，因为从SPS的角度，在基站缓存流行的内容，不仅可以改善用户体验，还可以减少对于回程网带宽的需求以节约成本，因此SPS必须要考虑最佳的缓存空间需求量以获得最大的收益。本文我们主要考虑这个问题，即在基站部署缓存的假设前提下，多个SPSs如何有效的共享这些缓存资源。本文的创新点主要有以下几方面：  • 本文的场景为一个基站和多个SPSs，系统被建模为寡头垄断市场，其中基站是产品（缓存空间）的提供方，以一定的价格（通过价格函数定义）向产品的需求方（SPSs）收取费用，SPSs共享基站的缓存空间。  • 我们将SPSs对于缓存空间的竞争建模为一个动态的非合作博弈的古诺模型，并通过基于Newton-Raphson方法的迭代算法来获得最佳的缓存空间需求量（古诺模型的纳什均衡解）。  • 仿真部分详细分析了不同参数下的这种动态缓存资源分配机制的性能和稳定性特征。

关键词：视频缓存；寡头垄断市场；博弈论；纳什均衡；稳定性分析

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工程采购的代理成本

陈守科,韦灼彬

《中国工程科学》 2005年第7卷第11期页码 66-71

摘要：

以非对称信息博弈及委托-代理理论为理论背景，分析了工程采购代理成本的产生、组成及内涵关系，并对最优激励合同的设计、最优监督策略及其成本做了分析说明。

关键词：工程采购代理成本非对称信息博弈委托-代理理论

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基于候选方案排序的进化决策方法

荔建琦,陈火旺,王兵山

《中国工程科学》 2001年第3卷第1期页码 62-70

摘要：

由于无法得到准确的期望效用函数，在信息不完全和结果不确定的环境下作出决策是困难的。提出基于候选方案排序的进化决策方法。通常通过分析得出一组与候选方案期望效用相关的指标，设计决策规则归结为寻找二者之间的相关关系。如果将所有候选方案按其对效用有影响的指标分为n类，并利用进化算法在n!空间中搜索全部方案的期望效用排序，则根据此排序作出最佳决策。提出针对排序问题的遗传算法。该方法较少依赖专家知识，无须显式地构造期望效用函数，能有效处理非数值或非量化指标以及指标冲突和指标相关等问题，在带随机噪声环境下仍能获得稳健解。在仿真机器人控制器设计中的应用表明了该方法的有效性。

关键词：进化决策进化机器人排序问题遗传算法

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标题作者时间类型操作

The impact of government incentives and penalties on willingness to recycle plastic waste: An evolutionarygame theory perspective

Zhen Wang, Jiazhen Huo, Yongrui Duan

期刊论文

Research on the ecological compensation standard of the basin pollution control project based on evolutionarygame theory and by taking Xiangjiang River as a case

Dongbin HU, Huiwu LIU, Xiaohong CHEN, Yang CHEN

期刊论文

Optimal production strategy for auto manufacturers with government subsidies in competitive environments

期刊论文

An application of game theory in distributed collaborative decision making

Angran XIAO

期刊论文

Developing a new model for simultaneous scheduling of two grand projects based on game theory and solving

Loghman PIRI, Vahidreza GHEZAVATI, Ashkan HAFEZALKOTOB

期刊论文

Benefit-based cost allocation for residentially distributed photovoltaic systems in China: A cooperative gametheory approach

Xi LUO, Xiaojun LIU, Yanfeng LIU, Jiaping LIU, Yaxing WANG